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1.  Introduction  
 
Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (1960) is considered as one of the 
most  influential  books  in the  history of  social  science. In this  masterpiece, Schelling 
introduced  the  concept of  focal  points  and  first  demonstrated their  existence  in  pure 
coordination games; later, Mehta et al. (1994a, b) replicated his informal experiments 
under  controlled  laboratory  conditions.  Although  unconventional  for  standard  game 
theory, these studies used a label-based focal points approach, in which strategies are 
distinguished by labels (e.g. words, pictures, or anything else that players can recognize), 
and generated expected coordination rates that are considerably higher than random play 
would suggest in these games. Players in pure coordination games thus tend to make use 
of salient labels to their mutual benefit and an equilibrium that results from such choices 
constitutes a focal point.   
The successful application of focal points in pure coordination games raises the 
possibility that players in Pareto-ranked coordination games may also make strategic use 
of labels and thus replicate the earlier success of focal points in this important class of 
coordination  games.  The  coordination  problem  embedded  in  a  Pareto-ranked 
coordination game is, however, more involved than that of in a pure coordination game. 
The  perennial  concern  in  such  a  game  is  how  to  coordinate  players’  choices  on  the 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium,  not just coordinating on any equilibrium. Therefore, it  is 
natural to inquire whether attaching salient labels to the Pareto-efficient strategy in these 
games can select the most efficient equilibrium. While the matter appears to be ripe for 







the role of focal points in implementing the Pareto-efficient equilibrium in these games. 
The  first objective of our study  is to address this omission and thereby  advance our 
knowledge of focal points.  
The  second  objective  of  our  study  is  to  determine  the  power  of  focal  points 
against  a  forceful  equilibrium  selection  device  that  is  applicable  to  Pareto-ranked 
coordination  games.  Experimental  studies  on  Pareto-ranked  coordination  games  have 
repeatedly demonstrated that subjects in these games are more likely to select the most 
inefficient equilibrium, the more risk-dominant that equilibrium is; thus subjects’ play is 
not governed by the Paretian efficiency.
1  But there exists no research that analyzes how 
focal labels, when attached to the Pareto-efficient strategy, would perform against the 
risk-dominance principle. This is surprising because focal points and risk-dominance can 
be  made  to  be  simultaneously  present  in  Pareto-ranked  games  and  they  both  may 
influence  players’  decisions,  and  still,  our  knowledge  about  their  relative  influence 
remains  severely  limited.  The  second  objective  of  our  study  aims  to  rectify  this 
limitation.  We assess the power of label-based focal points against the risk-dominance 
principle by systematically varying a measure of risk-dominance (due to Selten, 1995) in 
a  sequence  of  Pareto-ranked  games  while  controlling  for  the  payoff-dominance 
characteristic.     
                                                        
1There is substantial evidence against the claim that people use payoff-efficiency to solve the 
equilibrium selection problem in coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Some examples include 
Schmidt et al. (2003), Battalio et al. (2001), Straub (1995), Crawford (1991), and Van Huyck et al. (1990). 







We address these two objectives by utilizing a sequence of 2x2 symmetric stag-
hunt games.
2 In each of our games, one equilibrium is payoff-dominant (PD) and the 
other is risk-dominant (RD). Given identical equilibrium payoffs across the games, the 
payoff-dominance principle predicts the same frequency of play of the PD strategy in all 
of these games. Thus, the payoff-salience in each game is held at a common level. The 
games,  however,  systematically  differ  from  each  other  in  one  crucial  aspect:  the 
magnitude  of  the  risk-dominance  measure  of  the  payoff-dominated  equilibrium 
(discussed in section 3).  Based on this measure and the related results in the literature, 
we would expect  lower frequency of play of the PD strategy  in games with a larger 
magnitude of the risk-dominance measure.   
Our plan, as indicated above, is to attach to the PD strategy in each game labels, 
one at a time, which we have found to possess strong focal power
3.  If both of the players 
jointly recognize the salience of the  label attached to the PD strategy, then a rule of 
selection may emerge that would lead the players to choose that label and thus efficient 
coordination  may  ensue.  As a consequence of the above plan, the  following concern 
                                                        
2Our choice of this specific coordination game was motivated by three factors. First, the conflict 
between efficiency and risk has made stag-hunt games the canonical example of the equilibrium selection 
problem. Second, among the three most important classes of coordination games (pure coordination games, 
divergent-interest games of which the Battle-of-the Sexes is an example, and common-interest games with 
Pareto-ranked equilibria of  which stag-hunt is an example), stag-hunt games are the only coordination 
games in which focal points, risk-, and payoff-dominance can be simultaneously dealt with. Third, the 
game has been subjected to considerable laboratory scrutiny, which facilitates interpretation of our results 
within a broad literature.  
3According  to  Schelling,  some  decision  labels  have  “some  kind  of  prominence  or 
conspicuousness” (1960, p. 57) that makes those labels more salient than others. Similarly, Lewis (1969) 
coins the term of salience – uniqueness in some conspicuous respect. In the remainder of this study, we use 
the term “focal” in the sense of the salience of a decision label. Sugden (1995) develops a formal theory of 
focal points by explicitly introducing the labeling of strategies into the analysis and aims at a “general 







arises:  what  label  should  we  attach  to the  alternative  strategy  in  these  games?  More 
generally, do the labels attached to alternative strategies in a strategic form coordination 
game  make  any  difference  for  a  given  focal  label’s  ability  to  promote  successful 
coordination?
4 An answer to this question will  not only  shed  light on the concept of 
“relative salience” of a decision label, that is, how the salience of a given label is affected 
by the label salience of an alternative strategy, but it will also supply important inputs for 
our  experimental  design.  Furthermore,  an  affirmative  finding  would  reshape  our 
understanding of the way label-based focal points function in strategic form coordination 
games and thus may have serious efficiency implications when applied to Pareto-ranked 
coordination games.  
We  decided  to  conduct  a  brief  “verification”  experiment  utilizing  a  2x2  pure 
coordination game (Figure 1) and let the results of this experiment to inform our design 
of the subsequent treatments. When strategies are labeled, the pure coordination games 
are considered  ideal  for  filtering out factors that  might  induce players to choose one 
strategy rather than another and thus isolating the pure effects of labels. To this end, we 
attached the label “Year 2009” to one strategy and attached the labels “Year 2008” and 
“Year 1999”, one at a time, to the “other strategy” in our pure coordination game. This 
labeling procedure generated two treatments: in the first treatment, the “other strategy” is 
                                                        
4Mehta et al. considered one set of pure coordination games of the following form: “[W]rite down 
any year, past, present, or future”, in which players’ strategy sets were infinite. As a result, the issue of 
labeling of alternative strategies was suppressed. But if one attempts to explore the role of focal points in 
coordination games (pure or Pareto-ranked) represented in the strategic form, such a concern is certain to 
arise. Schelling (1960) considered games in both forms, but expressed his concern (p. 96) regarding the 
extent to which the success of focal points in pure coordination games with infinite strategy set can be 
transferred  to  strategic  form  games.    Furthermore,  Schelling  wondered  about  the  possible  effects  of 







labeled as “Year 2008”, and in the second treatment, the “other strategy” is labeled as 
“Year 1999”. We conjectured that “Year 2009” possesses stronger salience than the other 
two labels, and “Year 2008” possesses stronger salience than “Year 1999”.
5  Separate 
groups  of  60  subjects  participated  in  each  treatment  and  played  the  corresponding 
treatment  only  once  for  the  equivalent  dollar  amounts  as  shown  in  Figure  1.  Any 
significant difference in the frequency of play of “Year 2009” between the treatments can 
be attributed only to the label of the “other strategy”. 
In the first treatment, 70 percent of subjects (pooled across player roles as the 
symmetry would suggest) chose the label “Year 2009”, thereby achieving an expected 
coordination  rate  of  58  percent.  In  the  second  treatment,  by  contrast,  80  percent  of 
subjects chose the label “Year 2009”, thereby achieving an expected coordination rate of 
68 percent. Clearly, “Year 2009” has stronger salience than the other two labels in our 
subject population. But more importantly, the frequency of play of the label “Year 2009” 
increased by 14 percent when we altered the label of the “other strategy” from “Year 
2008”  to  “Year  1999”  (a  z-test  of  the  difference  in  the  proportions  of  “Year  2009” 
generated a statistic of 1.26, p < 0.10).   
Thus, the focal power of a given label seems to critically depend on the label 
salience of an alternative strategy in a pure coordination game. This is a useful insight for 
properly addressing our research objectives. If we are not careful enough in choosing the 
label of the alternative strategy in our three 2x2 stag-hunt games, then we may seriously 
                                                        
5Mehta et al. (1994a, b) found “current year” to be a strong focal point in pure coordination 
games. Since our experiment was conducted in 2009, we chose the label “Year 2009”. We discuss a rule in 







misjudge the efficiency-enhancing power of focal points in our experiment. In terms of 
the efficiency implications of such an oversight, a 14 percent difference might translate 
into a huge loss or gain, especially if the payoff in the PD equilibrium is considerably 
higher than that of in the Pareto-dominated equilibrium.  
Being equipped with this insight, we attach focal labels to the PD strategy in each 
game, one at a time.  For each focal label we attach to the PD strategy in each game, we 
attach two different labels to the alternative strategy in each game, one at a time, much in 
the same way as in our “verification” experiment. Thus, the above labeling procedure 
yields  two treatments  for  each  of  our  stag-hunt  games  under  each  focal  label  –  one 
treatment in which the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is weaker and another 
treatment in which the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is stronger, when the 
treatments are compared to each other. We explore two types of labels that implement the 
above procedure; one is textual while the other one is diagrammatical in nature. 
The experimental data reveal some surprising and yet robust results. Can a given 
focal  label  facilitate  efficient  coordination  in  2x2  symmetric  stag-hunt  games?
  As 
anticipated, the answer critically depends on the relative salience of the PD strategy’s 
label. When the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is weaker, each of the focal 
labels that we used plainly fails to raise the expected efficient coordination rate even to 
the level prescribed by the mixed-strategy play in each of our games except the one with 
the lowest measure of risk-dominance. When the relative salience of the PD strategy’s 
label is stronger, each of our focal labels raises the expected efficient coordination rate 







the one with the highest measure of risk-dominance. In our experiment, a systematic 
manipulation in the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label between treatments raised 
expected efficient coordination rate by as much as 167 percent and payoff-efficiency by 
as much as 75 percent. 
The above result has an important corollary. Since Schelling’s investigations, it 
may have been implicitly believed in the literature that the drawing power of a focal label 
is absolute in the sense that it is independent of how alternative strategies are labeled. 
Our results show that this belief may be misplaced. We show that by altering the label 
salience  of  an  alternative  strategy  in  a  sequence  of  2x2  Pareto-ranked  coordination 
games, one may influence the relative salience of a given focal label and thus may dilute 
or enhance the drawing power of that label in fostering coordination.  
How does a given focal label perform against the risk-dominance principle in 2x2 
symmetric  stag-hunt  games?  There  is  clear  evidence  that  regardless  of  the  relative 
salience  of  the  PD  strategy’s  label,  the  capacity  of  a  given  focal  label  to  stimulate 
efficient  coordination  decreases  monotonically  as  the  Pareto-dominated  equilibrium 
becomes more risk-dominant across our games. Although, the importance of the relative 
salience of the PD strategy’s label is very much prominent even when the risk-dominance 
of the Pareto-dominated equilibrium is very high. In the stag-hunt game with the highest 
level of risk dominance that we considered, expected efficient coordination rate increased 
by as much as 167 percent and payoff efficiency by as much as 50 percent when the 







 The rest of the paper  is organized as  follows. Section 2  briefly discusses the 
relevant  literature. Section 3  introduces the experiment. Section 4 reports the results, 
while section 5 concludes. 
2.  Related Literature 
In this section, we briefly discuss how our study fits into the broad literature on 
experimental  coordination  games.  Our  study  appeals  to the  three  streams  of  research 
within this literature and we discuss each of them in turn.  
 The idea of focal points has attracted considerable attention from experimental 
economists.  Besides  the  classic  contributions  by  Mehta  et  al.  (1994a,  b),  studies  by 
Bardsley et al. (2009), Blume & Gneezy (2000), and Bacharach & Bernasconi (1997) 
have extended generous support to the effectiveness of label salience as a source of focal 
points in solving coordination problems. Specifically, Bardsley et al. (2009) designs an 
experiment  to  distinguish  between  alternative  explanations  of  how  players  use  label-
based focal points to select equilibria in one-shot pure and Pareto-ranked coordination 
games. Blume & Gneezy (2000) examines the role of endogenous focal points in pure 
coordination games that  lack a  common description. Bacharach  &  Bernasconi (1997) 
investigates  the  variable  frame  theory  of  focal  points  in  pure  coordination  games. 
Crawford et al. (2009) is an exception that points out the limited role of label-based focal 
points in achieving coordination success in the constant sum battle-of-the sexes games. 
None  of  the  above  studies,  however,  analyzes  the  effectiveness  of  label-based  focal 
points in Pareto-ranked coordination games like we do. Our study aims to fill this gap in 







Legions  of  experimental  studies  have  sought  ways  to  implement  the  Pareto-
efficient outcome in various types of Pareto-ranked coordination games; nevertheless, in 
this massive literature there is no study of which we are aware that analyzes the role of 
focal  points  as  an  efficiency-enhancing  device.
6  Our  study  contributes  to  this  large 
literature by examining the role of yet another important selection device in this well-
known class of coordination games. 
Finally, there is a relatively small but growing literature that analyzes the relative 
strengths of risk- and payoff-dominance principles in Pareto-ranked coordination games 
(cf. footnote 1). But these studies do not explore the nature of interaction between focal 
points and the two dominance principles in a unified framework, even though all of them 
can be simultaneously present in Pareto-ranked games. The current study explores such 
an avenue of research. 
3.  Experiment 
                                                        
6There is a large body of literature that documents the effectiveness of various selection devices in 
solving the equilibrium selection problem in two broad classes of experimental coordination games with 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. 2X2 coordination games: one- and two-way communication (Cooper et al. 1992), 
forward induction (Cooper et al. 1992), past actions and observability (Duffy & Feltovich 2006), cheap talk 
and  past  action  (Duffy  &  Feltovich  2002),  role  of  payoff-  and  risk-dominance  (Schmidt  et  al.  2003; 
Battalio et al. 2001; Straub 1995), labeling of subjects (Van Huyck et al. 1997), payoff disparity between 
equilibria and its impact on the choice of Pareto-efficient equilibrium (Friedman 1996), cheap talk (Clark et 
al. 2001; Charness 2000), network structure (Cassar 2007). Higher-order coordination games: cheap talk 
(Blume & Ortmann 2007), inter-group competition (Bornstein et al. 2002), loss avoidance (Cachon & 
Camerer 1996), use of dominated strategies (Cooper et al. 1990), precedent transfer (Devetag 2005), use of 
informal sanctions (Dugar 2009), cost of coordinating on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium (Goeree & Holt 
2005), local interaction on a network (Keser et al. 1998), inter-generational advice (Chaudhuri et al. 2009), 
group size (Van Huyck et al. 1990), asset market competition (Van Huyck et al. 1993), credible external 
assignment of actions (Van Huyck et al. 1992), financial incentives in terms of bonuses (Brandts & Cooper 
2006),  various  facial  and  physical  gestures  (Manzini  et  al.  2009),  manager-employee  communication 
(Brandts & Cooper 2007), adaptive dynamics (Crawford 1995), evolutionary dynamics in large and small 







This  section  is  divided  into  three  subsections.  Subsection  3.1  introduces  a 
measure of risk-dominance for a generic 2x2 symmetric stag-hunt game and then attaches 
three sets of values to the parameters of the generic game, thus creating three distinct 
stag-hunt games. This subsection also derives the theoretical predictions for each game. 
Subsection 3.2 introduces the two labeling schemes used in the experiment and provides 
rationale  behind  their  use.  Subsection  3.3  presents  the  experimental  session-specific 
information and states the testable hypotheses.  
3.1 The Stag-Hunt Games 
Consider the generic 2x2 symmetric game shown in Figure 2.  Each player i (= 1, 
2) has a finite set Si of pure strategies; the elements of Si are denoted by sij where j = 1, 2. 
Figure 2 shows the payoffs to the players for each pair of strategies. Let a > c and b > d.  
The generic game then has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria at (s11, s21) and (s12, s22), 




 where pi1 is the 
probability with which player i chooses strategy si1. The strategy pair (s11, s21) strictly 
payoff-dominates (s12, s22) if a > b. A Nash equilibrium is considered strictly PD if it is 
strictly  Pareto-superior  to  all  other  Nash  equilibria  in  a  game.  In  other  words,  a PD 
equilibrium offers a strictly higher payoff to each player than any other equilibria in a 
game.  Selten  (1995)  advanced  a  measure  of  risk-dominance  that  we  employ  here  to 
calculate the risk-dominance of the inferior equilibrium. Following our notation, Selten’s 
(1995, p. 221) weighted average log measure of risk-dominance of the equilibrium (s12, 
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If R is positive, then (s12, s22) is RD. If R is negative, then (s11, s21) is RD, which is 
never the case in the games we study. If R is zero, then the symmetric mixed-strategy 
Nash  equilibrium  is  RD.  Let  c a d b    ,  which  ensures  the  risk-dominance  of  the 
equilibrium (s12, s22) over (s11, s21). With two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, one of which 
is Pareto-dominant while the other one is risk-dominant, our generic game now is a stag-
hunt coordination game. Notice that, by manipulating the off-diagonal parameters (c and 
d) while keeping the diagonal parameters (a and b) unchanged in our generic stag-hunt 
game, we can vary the measure of R. 
Next, we attach three sets of values, which follow the above restrictions, to the 
parameters  in  Figure  2  to  generate  three  stag-hunt  games  that  we  utilize  in  our 
experiment. The games are given in Figure 3. In each game, (s11, s21) and (s12, s22) are the 
PD and the RD equilibria, respectively, and si1 and si2 are the PD and the RD strategies, 
respectively,  for  each  player  i.  The  games  share  the  same  payoff-dominance 
characteristic;  the  measures  of  risk-dominance,  however,  are  different  across  these 
games. Table 1 lists the following characteristics for each game: the magnitude of the 
risk-dominance measure (R), the probability, for each player, with which the PD strategy 
is to be chosen in each pure-strategy and symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
The table also includes the probability of coordination (Pr(C)), the probability of efficient 







coordination (Pr(EC/C)), the expected earnings,  and the  “payoff- efficiency”  for each 
equilibrium. The  “payoff-efficiency”  is defined  as the sum of the payoffs of the two 
players, normalized so that the maximum possible joint payoff in a given game has an 
efficiency of 1 and the minimum has an efficiency of zero. As Table 1 shows, the risk-
dominance measures for the three games are R = log(1), R = log(1.5), and R = log(3); we 
denote the games by L, M, and H, respectively.  
3.2 The Labeling Schemes  
In this study we use the term label to describe how a strategy is presented to a 
player in our experiment. A label can be a number, a letter, a name, a color, or a shape, 
etc. In this  study, as  in  Crawford et al. (2009), Bardsley  et al. (2008), Bacharach  & 
Bernasconi (1997), and Mehta et al. (1994a, b), we exogenously assign distinct labels to 
the strategies, for each player, of our stag-hunt games. A labeling scheme of a game thus 
assigns a label L(sij) to each strategy sij of player i, such that each strategy for player i has 
a  distinct  label.  When  the  strategies  are  labeled,  players  choose  among the  labels  to 
indicate their choice of a strategy.  
We adopt two different types of labeling schemes for our experiment – one is 
textual and the other is graphical; the schemes are denoted as YEAR (Y) and DOT (D), 
respectively. The above three stag-hunt games are subjected to each  labeling scheme 
separately  in  our  experiment.  Under  the  Y  scheme,  which  we  already  discussed  in 
Section 1, the strategies are labeled as names of years; players decide on a strategy by 
choosing between the two year-names. Under the D scheme, the strategies are labeled as 







line. The common element in the two schemes, which is exploited by our design, is that, 
within each scheme, there exists a natural ranking of the labels in terms of their distance 
(over time or space) from one another.    
We require each of the  labeling schemes to satisfy the  following two criteria. 
First,  under  each  scheme,  the  label  attached  to  the  PD  strategy  must  possess  a 
considerably higher level of salience than those of the labels attached to the alternative 
strategy in each game. This seems a natural criterion to have given that our first objective 
is  to  generate  as  much  efficient  coordination  as  possible  using  strong  focal  labels. 
Second, the salience of the labels attached to the alternative strategy in each game must 
differ  from each other  in such  a  manner so that they  have discernible  impact on the 
relative salience of the PD strategy’s label. The second criterion appears to be a logical 
prerequisite for understanding the implication of varying the relative salience of the PD 
strategy’s label in the stag-hunt games; this is especially appealing given the results from 
our “verification” experiment stated earlier. We checked whether each labeling scheme 
meets these two criteria by conducting a verification experiment for each of them. Each 
verification  treatment  uses  a  2x2  pure  coordination  game  with  labeled  strategies, 
considered ideal for isolating pure effects of labels.  
Under the Y scheme, we label the PD strategy in each game as “Year 2009”, 
which is the current year during which the experiment is conducted. Given the finding in 
Mehta et al. (1994a, b), we expect “Year 2009” to have strong focal power. In order to 
vary the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label under this scheme, the alternative 







reported in Section 1 have already verified that the two criteria are satisfied by the Y 
scheme in a pure coordination game. In view of those results, the Y scheme generates 
two treatments for each of the three stag-hunt games – a “Strong” (S) treatment in which 
the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is stronger (i.e., the alternative strategy’s 
label is “Year 1999”) and a “Weak” (W) treatment in which the relative salience of the 
PD strategy’s label is weaker (i.e., the alternative strategy’s label is “Year 2008”). We 
expect that in each game the frequency of play of the PD strategy’s label to be higher 
when the alternative strategy’s label is “Year 1999” than when it is “Year 2008”.  
Why may subjects treat the label “Year 2008” differently than the label “Year 
1999”, when attached to the alternative strategy in each game? One may apply the “rule 
of closeness” (discussed in Mehta et al. 1994b, p. 169) to shed light on this question. The 
rule emerges from mutual recognition of a close association or proximity between, for 
example,  two  objects.  The  concept  can  be  understood  as  a  rule  specifying  a  spatial 
relation, a relation in terms of color, time etc. between labels. Moreover, the rule has been 
previously shown to be used by players in coordination games to choose among labels. 
According to this rule, “Year 1999” is further from “Year 2009” than “Year 2008” is 
from “Year 2009”. As a result, players applying this rule may find the label “Year 2009” 
relatively more salient when that label is contrasted against “Year 1999” than when it is 
contrasted against “Year 2008”.
7  
                                                        
7We suspect that the labels in each scheme can also be ranked in terms of their salience (primary, 
secondary, or Schelling) in the population, but for our purpose this information is not essential. See Mehta 







Under the D scheme, the PD strategy in each game is labeled as the “Middle dot” 
on a straight line. Schelling (1960, p. 57) and a large number of studies related to the 
Ultimatum game experiments (see for example, Guth et al., 2001) have found that “equal 
division” possesses strong salience. Based on these findings, we expect “Middle dot” to 
have strong focal power. To vary the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label, the 
alternative strategy in each game is labeled as a second dot on the left of the midpoint and 
its distance from the midpoint is changed.
8 The second dot is placed either at a short 
distance from the midpoint (“Close left dot”) or at a longer distance from the midpoint 
(“Distant left dot”) (see Figure 3). We ran a brief “verification” experiment, similar to the 
previous one, for the D scheme as well to check whether the alternative strategy’s labels 
have a similar impact on the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label. Interestingly, the 
results from these treatments are exactly the same as those from the treatments under the 
Y scheme reported in Section 1.
9 In view of these results, the D scheme generates two 
treatments for each of the three stag-hunt games – a “Strong” (S) treatment in which the 
relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is stronger (i.e., the alternative strategy’s label 
is “Distant left dot”) and a “Weak” (W) treatment in which the relative salience of the PD 
                                                        
8After initial experimentation, we found out that positioning the second dot on either side of the 
midpoint does not affect the quality of subjects’ decisions. 
9“Middle dot” is chosen 70% of the time when paired with “Close left dot” and 80% of the time 
when paired with “Distant left dot”. Using the corresponding proportions of choice for each of the two 
treatments,  we  reject  the  null hypothesis  that  the  choices  are  equally  likely  in  that  treatment  (for  the 
treatment with “Close left dot”, z = 3.10, p < 0.001; for the treatment with “Distant left dot”, z = 4.65, p < 
0.001). This  confirms that  “Middle  dot”  indeed  have  higher  salience  than the  two  alternative  strategy 
labels. But more importantly, the frequency of play of the label “Middle dot” increased by 14 percent when 
we altered the label of the “other strategy” from “Close left dot” to “Distant left dot” (a z-test of the 
difference in the proportions of “Middle point” generated a statistic of 1.26, p < 0.10). These two results 
confirm that the D scheme also meets the two  criteria stated earlier. Our design does not allow us to 
comment on what type of salience was induced in this experiment. Subjects may have played according to 







strategy’s label is weaker (i.e., the alternative strategy’s label is “Close left dot”). We 
expect that in each game the frequency of play of the PD strategy’s label to be higher 
when the alternative strategy’s label is “Distant left dot” than when it is “Close left dot”.  
The relation between the labels used in the D scheme can also be understood by 
applying the rule of closeness: “Distant left dot” is further from the “Middle dot” than 
“Close left dot” is from the “Middle dot”. As a result, players applying this rule may find 
the  label  “Middle  dot”  relatively  more  salient  when  that  label  is  contrasted  against 
“Distant left dot” than when it is contrasted against “Close left dot”.  
Since  both  of  our  proposed  labeling  schemes  have  successfully  met  both  the 
criteria,  we  decided  to  employ  these  schemes  in  our  experiment.  The  two  labeling 
schemes coupled with our three stag-hunt games therefore generate a total of 12 (2x3x2) 
treatments listed in Table 2. We recognize that for any individual, the relative salience of 
these labels would depend on matters of age, taste, culture, nationality and other personal 
associations.  However,  in  our  design,  the  cultural  determinants  of  salience  are  held 
constant as much as possible by subjecting all the treatments to the same population of 
students, thus permitting direct tests of the label-specific effects. In the following, we 







3.3 The Sessions   
As indicated above, we have a total of 12 treatments corresponding to the three 
stag-hunt games. Each of these treatments was played by a separate group of 60 subjects. 
The parameter values reported in subsection 3.1 have been used in the actual experiment 
as equivalent dollar amounts. Each treatment consisted of two experimental sessions in 
each of which a group of 30 subjects participated in a one-shot game. For each treatment, 
one session was conducted at the San Diego State University and the other was conducted 
at the University of Calgary. During a session, upon arrival at the lab, each subject was 
randomly assigned a registration number and given a copy of the instructions. They were 
also  given  a  “Decision  Sheet”  where  they  could  indicate  their  choices.
10  After  the 
instructions were read aloud, the subjects were  asked to make their decisions on the 
Decision Sheet only once, which mentioned their registration numbers. After the subjects 
were done, the decision sheets were collected. The subjects were then randomly paired by 
picking up two decision sheets at a time in a random manner. The registration numbers of 
the subjects within the pair and their choices were then publicly announced and written 
on a white board. We also wrote on the board the money each registration number earned 
by looking up at the payoff matrix of the game the session was playing. The subjects 
were paid privately in cash right after the session.
11 Each session lasted for less than 30 
minutes.   
                                                        
10In the Y scheme, the subjects wrote down their choices while in the D scheme they circled the 
dot of their choice on a diagram similar to Figure 3.  
11Subjects also received 5 US or Canadian dollars, as the case may be, as a show-up fee in addition 







Now, before we proceed to the discussion of the results from the experiment, we 
would like to clearly state our two general hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: The frequency of play of the PD strategy’s label in each stag-hunt 
game is expected to be higher when the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is 
relatively stronger (S treatment) than when it is relatively weaker (W treatment). 
Hypothesis 2: Under a given labeling scheme (Y or D), in each treatment (S or W) 
the frequency of play of the PD strategy’s label is expected to be lower, the higher the 
measure of risk-dominance (R).  
4.  Results  
The  results  from  the  experiment  are  presented  in  Figure  5.  The  upper  panel 
diagrams correspond to the D scheme and the lower panel diagrams correspond to the Y 
scheme.  A  diagram  under  a  given  labeling  scheme shows  both  the  absolute  and  the 
relative frequencies with which the two strategies are chosen in each of the three games; 
the  maximum  possible  absolute  frequency  in  each  game  is  60.  The  most  interesting 
feature of the data is revealed when we compare, for a given labeling scheme, the choice 
frequencies of the PD strategy between the W and the S treatment of a given game.  
  Consistent with our Hypothesis 1, we find that, under each labeling scheme, the 
PD strategy’s choice frequency is higher in the S treatment than in the corresponding W 
treatment in each game. Under the D scheme, these frequencies are 60%, 45% and 25% 
in L-DOTW, M-DOTW and H-DOTW, respectively, which increase to 85%, 60% and 40% 
in L-DOTS, M-DOTS and H-DOTS, respectively. Under the Y scheme, the frequencies 







increase to 90%, 75% and 41.7% in L-YEARS, M-YEARS and H-YEARS, respectively.
12 
Notice that these frequencies are rather different than the corresponding mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibrium predictions (Table 1). According to the mixed-strategy play, the choice 
frequency  of  the  PD  strategy  will  increase  as  the  magnitude  of  the  risk-dominance 
measure increases across our games, which is just the opposite of what we observe in the 
experimental data. In sum, the data bear remarkable evidence that the PD strategy labels 
“Year  2009”  and  “Middle  dot”  possess  stronger  salience  than  the  corresponding 
alternative strategy labels, and the efficiency-enhancing power of these two focal labels 
seem to critically depend upon the label salience of the alternative strategy. These results 
are reminiscent of our findings from the two “verification” experiments.  
  To further scrutinize the magnitude of change in the choice frequency of the PD 
strategy between the W and the S treatment in each game and under each scheme, we 
construct  Table  3.  This  table  compares  the  absolute  frequencies  of  the  PD  strategy 
between the  W and the S treatment  for each of the three games under each  labeling 
scheme. In agreement with our observation in the preceding paragraph, in each game 
under each scheme the choice frequency of the PD strategy always registers an increment 
in the S treatment when compared to the corresponding W treatment. On the average 
                                                        
 
12In Schmidt et al. (2003), in the one-shot experiment with a stag-hunt game with R = 0, the PD 
strategy was played only 60% of the time, which is the same as the lowest we ever get in L-DOTW. In their 
experiment, the strategies were labeled as “A” and “B”. We recognize that the payoff-dominance measure 
of the game in question in Schmidt et al. (2003) was 0.4, which is slightly lower than the 0.5 measure in 
our study. We also know that subjects in their experiment decreased the choice of the PD strategy, for a 
given level of R, as the payoff-dominance measure was increased.  Therefore, when comparing the choice 
frequencies of the PD strategy in L-DOTS, L-DOTW, L-YEARS, and L-YEARW with that of Schmidt et 
al.’s corresponding treatment, one may attribute the choice frequency of the PD strategy beyond 60% to the 







(across  games  and  labeling  schemes),  the  PD  strategy  is  chosen  39  times  in  the  S 
treatment, whereas the same strategy is chosen 29 times in the W treatment, thus resulting 
in an average increase of 34.5% between the two treatments. In both of the schemes, this 
increment attains the maximum in Game H; the frequency of the PD strategy increases by 
as much as 60% in Game H. Each row of Table 3 also reports a z-test statistic. A casual 
inspection  reveals  that  the  difference  in  the  choice  frequencies  of  the  PD  strategy 
between the S and the W treatment in each game under each labeling scheme is highly 
significant.  Raising  the  relative  salience  of  a  given  PD  strategy  label  thus  makes  a 
statistically significant difference in terms of the frequency with which the most efficient 
strategy is chosen in each game we consider.  
  Next, we analyze the impact of increasing the relative salience of a given focal 
label on coordination and efficiency. By utilizing the relative frequencies of the strategy 
choices,  Table  4  lists  the  probability  of  coordination  (Pr(C)),  probability  of  efficient 
coordination  (Pr(EC)),  the  probability  of  efficient  coordination  conditional  on 
coordination (Pr(EC|C)), the expected earnings, and the payoff efficiency for each game 
under each labeling scheme.   
First, we focus on the statistic Pr(C). We find that, under each scheme, Pr(C) in 
Game L and Game M are higher when the relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is 
stronger than when it is weaker. The S treatment under each scheme, however, fails to 
produce higher expected coordination rate in Game H. In fact, Pr(C) decreases in the two 
S treatments in this game. The reason may be the following. In Game H, the alternative 







relatively higher prominence as an effective coordination device. As a result, when the 
relative salience of the PD strategy’s label is enhanced in the S treatment in Game H, 
some  subjects  may  have  chosen  the  alternative  strategy  being  swayed  by  the  risk-
dominance  criterion,  while  other  subjects  may  have  chosen  according  to  the  label 
salience principle. The conflicting drawing powers of label salience and risk-dominance 
thus may have raised the chance of miscoordination and resulted in a lower expected 
coordination rate in Game H. But recall that when the equilibria are Pareto-ranked, our 
goal  is  not  just to  achieve  higher  coordination;  but  we  would  like  to  achieve  higher 
coordination on the PD equilibrium. The fact that Pr(C) decreases in the S treatment of 
Game H under each labeling scheme does not necessarily imply that efficiency will also 
be lower in this game.     
  To examine if we can achieve higher efficiency when the relative salience of a 
given  PD  strategy  label  is  enhanced,  we  concentrate  our  focus  on  Pr(EC),  expected 
earnings, and the payoff-efficiency. Table 4 shows that not only Pr(EC), but Pr(EC|C) is 
also higher in the S treatment than in the corresponding W treatment in each game under 
each labeling scheme, and these increases are sometimes pretty large. On the average 
(across  labeling  schemes), when the relative salience of a given PD  strategy  label  is 
stronger, Pr(EC) increases by 63.3%, 83.3% and 154.8% in Game L, Game M and Game 
H, respectively. On the average (across labeling schemes), when the relative salience of a 
given PD strategy label is stronger, Pr(EC|C) increases by 22.9%, 61.3% and 96.7% in 
Game L, Game M and Game H, respectively. Notice that, the effect of manipulating the 







level when the risk-dominance of the alternative strategy is also at the highest among the 
levels we considered. On the average (across labeling schemes and games), Pr(EC) and 
Pr(EC|C) increase by 70.4% and 45.8%, respectively, between the S and the W treatment. 
We  also  notice  that,  in  Game  L  and  Game  M,  both  Pr(EC)  and  Pr(EC|C)  in  the  S 
treatments  are  higher  than  the  symmetric  mixed-strategy  predictions  in  these  games 
(Game L: 0.25 and 0.50; Game M: 0.36 and 0.69, respectively). 
  Since  both  Pr(EC)  and  Pr(EC|C)  are  higher  in  the  S  treatment  than  in  the 
corresponding W treatment in each game under each labeling scheme, it is obvious that 
expected earnings would also be higher in the S treatments than the corresponding W 
treatments  in these games. It is, however, to our surprise that Pr(EC), Pr(EC|C), and 
expected earnings are higher in the S treatment than in the corresponding W treatment in 
Game  H as well. On the average (across games and  labeling  schemes), the expected 
earnings increase from $3.86 in the W treatment to $4.39 in the S treatment – a 13.7% 
increase. In Game L and Game M but not in Game H, the S treatments achieve higher 
expected  earnings  than  predicted  by  the  corresponding  mixed-strategy  predictions  in 
these games ($4.00 and $4.20 in Game L and Game M, respectively). 
  The  increase  in  expected  earnings  we  discussed  above  readily  indicates  a 
considerable improvement in the payoff efficiency in the S treatments when compared to 
the corresponding W treatments. We see in Table 4 that the efficiency value is higher in 
each W treatment than in the corresponding S treatment. An efficiency of 0.69 is the 
highest that we achieve among all of the W treatments, while the highest is 0.84 among 







the W treatments, while the lowest is 0.21 among all of the S treatments. On the average 
(across  games  and  labeling  schemes),  the  efficiency  increases  from  0.33  in  the  S 
treatment  to  0.51  in  the  W  treatment  –  a  54.5%  increase.  Even  though  we  failed  to 
achieve higher Pr(C) in the S treatments compared to the corresponding W treatments in 
Game  H,  yet  we  are  able  to  gain  in  payoff  efficiency  by  more  than  46%  in  each  S 
treatment than the corresponding W treatment for this game. Given our knowledge from 
previous  studies  regarding  the  difficulty  in  achieving  the  efficient  outcome  in  the 
presence  of  a  highly  risk-dominant  outcome,  our  success  in  Game  H  is  substantial. 
Moreover, in Game L and Game M, the S treatments achieve higher efficiency than the 
corresponding mixed-strategy predictions in these games (0.33 and 0.40 in Game L and 
Game M, respectively). All the results discussed above provide strong support for our 
Hypothesis 1.   
In order to test our Hypothesis 2, we compare the choice frequency of the PD 
strategy across games in a given treatment condition (W or S) under a given labeling 
scheme (Y or D). Consistent with our hypothesis and the findings in previous studies 
(Schmidt et al., 2003), we find that the proportion of the PD strategy decreases as the 
risk-dominance of the alternative strategy increases across our games – the proportion of 
the PD strategy is lower in Game M than in Game L and, again, in Game H than in Game 
M. Under the D scheme, the proportions of the PD strategy are 60% (W) and 85% (S) in 
Game L which decrease to 45% (W) and 60% (S), respectively, in Game M and then to 
25% (W) and 40% (S), respectively, in Game H. We find a similar trend under the Y 







results supplement the previous finding by suggesting that subjects’ responsiveness to 
changes in R in stag-hunt games is independent of the relative salience of a given PD 
strategy label and the type of labels (textual or graphic) used.  
  We bring our discussion of the results to an end with a comparison between the 
two labeling schemes in terms of the success we achieve by manipulating the relative 
salience of a given PD strategy label. When we look at the percent increase in the PD 
strategy frequency in Table 3, we find that the Y scheme does better than the D scheme in 
two of the three games (L and H). In terms of percentage increase in the probability of 
coordination, probability of efficient coordination, expected earnings and efficiency in 
the  W  treatments,  the  comparison  between  the  two  schemes  is  inconclusive;  neither 
scheme has consistently performed better than the other one except in Game L where the 
Y scheme consistently outperformed the D scheme. 
5.  Conclusion   
The goal of this paper was to examine how a given salient label, when attached to 
the  Pareto-dominant  strategy,  may  enhance  efficiency  by  making  the  most  efficient 
equilibrium in a 2x2 Pareto-ranked game focal. The results of our precursor experiment 
reveled that the power of a given salient label to produce a focal point depends on the 
label of the alternative strategy – it’s the relative salience, not the absolute salience, of a 
label  that  determines  the  strength  of  the  focal  point  that  a  given  salient  label  might 
generate in a strategic-form pure coordination game. Based on these results, in our main 
experiment, we hypothesized that the frequency of play of the Pareto-dominant strategy 







from the experiment have supported the hypotheses; we achieved a substantial increase in 
efficiency when the relative salience of the label for the Pareto-dominant strategy was 
strengthened, even when the risk-dominance of the alternative strategy was very high. In 
fact, the effect of manipulating the relatively salience was at its highest level when the 
risk-dominance  of  the  alternative  strategy  was  at  the  highest  among  the  levels  we 
considered. These findings confirmed that focal points can indeed help achieve higher 
efficiency and highlights the importance of being careful when labeling the alternative 
strategy. 
We also examined how three selection devices (namely, payoff-dominance, risk-
dominance and focal points) when present simultaneously in a game may affect choice of 
strategies. Our experimental results  have supplemented the  literature by  showing that 
raising the risk-dominance  level of the alternative  strategy while keeping the payoff-
dominance level of the Pareto-dominant strategy constant reduces the frequency of play 
of the Pareto-dominant strategy and this trend is independent of the relatively salience of 
the  label  attached  to  the  Pareto-dominant  strategy  and  the  type  of  labels  (textual  or 
graphical) assigned to the strategies. The findings of the current study have advanced our 
knowledge about focal points and their applicability, and how they perform in contrast 
and combination with other selection devices. Future extensions of the study can focus on 
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Instructions for the Y scheme, R = 0 game 
Welcome to this experiment. You have  been randomly assigned a registration 
number, which is written on the other side of this page. This number will be used to 
identify you during the experiment. Your real identity will remain strictly anonymous 
during and after the experiment. 
In this experiment you will play a game with another person only once and the 
amount of money you will receive from the experiment would depend on both of your 
decisions. In this experiment we will pay you in Canadian dollars and we will pay you 
privately at the end of the experiment.   
Please do not talk to others while the experiment is in progress. The game that 
will be played by each of you is introduced next.  
Game  
You will be randomly paired with another person in this room. Both you and this 
other player you are paired with will separately and independently select an option. Both 
of you will only have two options to choose from: Year 2009 and Year 2008. Based upon 
your combined decision, you and the other player will be able to earn money. There are 
four possible situations: 
1.  If both of you choose Year 2009, then both of you will earn $6. 
2.  If both of you choose Year 2008, then both of you will earn $3. 
3.  If you choose Year 2008 and the other player chooses Year 2009, then you 
will earn $5 and the other player will earn $2. 
4.  If you choose Year 2009 and the other player chooses Year 2008, then you 
will earn $2 and the other player will earn $5. 
At the end of the experiment, you will be in one of these four situations.    
Procedure  
After  everyone  finishes  making  their  choice,  the  assistant  will  collect  all  the 
decision pages. Then the assistant will randomly draw two decision pages at a time. The 
two registration numbers on these two decision pages will form a pair. The assistant will 
then write down those two registration  numbers and  list each player’s choice on the 
whiteboard. This will inform you about the other person’s (with whom you are matched 
with) choice and how much money each of you made. You will never be told during or 
after the experiment the identity of the other player in your pair. 
Please write down your choice (either Year 2009 or Year 2008) in the designated 
space provided on the next page, when you are ready. Please raise your hand when you 
are done recording your choice; the assistant will come to you and collect this decision 
page.  
After the assistant is finished with drawing all the decision pages, the experiment 
will come to an end. You are now requested to wait outside the room. Your name will be 
announced to pay you in private. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. The 




































Figure 4. The three stag-hunt games 
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Figure 2. A generic 2x2 stag-hunt game 
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Figure 1. The pure coordination game 
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Game 1 Game 2 Game 3
W Treatments
 
Figure 5. Absolute and relative frequencies of the PD and the alternative strategies 
(the PD strategy in the darker shade) 
DOT Scheme – W Treatments 
DOT Scheme – S Treatments 
YEAR Scheme – W Treatments  YEAR Scheme – S Treatments 
   
   
Game L (L-DOTW)   Game H (H-DOTW)   Game M (M-DOTW)   Game L (L-DOTS)   Game M (M-DOTS)   Game H (H-DOTS)  









Table 1. The theoretical predictions for the three games 
 
 
Table 2. Experimental design: 12 treatments  
Labeling Scheme 
YEAR (Y)  DOT (D) 
Relative Salience of the 
PD Strategy Label 
Relative Salience of the 
PD Strategy Label 
Game 
Indexed by R 
Weak (W)  Strong (S)  Weak (W)  Strong (S) 
L  L-YEARW  L-YEARS  L-DOTW  L-DOTS 
M  M-YEARW  M-YEARS  M-DOTW  M-DOTS 











































































Note: Each treatment is named in the following manner: the first letter denotes the 
magnitude  of  the  risk-dominance  measure,  the  second  word  denotes  the  specific 
labeling scheme, and the subscript denotes the degree of relative salience of the PD 










Table 3. Frequency of the PD strategy in each game under each scheme 







W  S 
Percentage 





YEAR  36  51  41.7%  3.07  0.00  L 
DOT  48  54  12.5%  1.53  0.06 
YEAR  27  36  33.3%  1.65  0.05  M 
DOT  33  45  36.4%  2.30  0.01 
YEAR  15  24  60.0%  1.75  0.04  H 
DOT  16  25  56.3%  1.73  0.04 
Average    29  39  34.5%  -  - 
 
 
 Table 4. Expected coordination, earnings and efficiency (mixed-strategy Nash predictions are in parentheses) 
Pr(C) 
 
Pr(EC)  Pr(EC|C)  Expected Earnings  Payoff Efficiency  Game 
Indexe





W  S  % 
Increas
e in S 
W  S  % 
Increas
e in S 
W  S  % 
Increas
e in S 
W  S  % 
Increas
e in S 
W  S  % 
Increas
e in S 
YEAR  0.52  0.74  42.3%  0.36  0.72  100.0%  0.69  0.97  40.6%  $4.3
2 
$5.30  22.7%  0.44  0.77  75.0% 
DOT  0.68  0.82  20.6%  0.64  0.81  26.6%  0.94  0.99  5.3%  $5.0
8 
$5.52  8.7%  0.69  0.84  21.7% 
L 
  (0.50)    (0.25)    (0.50)    ($4.00)    (0.33)   
YEAR  0.50  0.52  4.0%  0.20  0.36  80.0%  0.40  0.69  72.5%  $3.73  $4.2
0 
12.6%  0.24  0.40  66.7% 
DOT  0.50  0.62  24.0%  0.30  0.56  86.7%  0.60  0.90  50.0%  $4.03  $4.7
8 
18.6%  0.34  0.59  73.5% 
M 
  (0.52)    (0.36)    (0.69)    ($4.20)    (0.40)   
YEAR  0.62  0.52  -16.1%  0.06  0.16  166.7%  0.10  0.31  210.0%  $3.00  $3.2
4 
8.0%  0.14  0.21  50.0% 
DOT  0.61  0.51  -16.4%  0.07  0.17  142.9%  0.12  0.34  183.3%  $3.02  $3.2
8 
8.6%  0.15  0.22  46.7% 
H 
  (0.63)    (0.56)    (0.89)    ($4.50)    (0.57)   
Average  0.57  0.62  8.8%  0.27  0.46  70.4%  0.48  0.70  45.8%  $3.86  $4.39  13.7%  0.33  0.51  54.5% 
 
 